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Um estudo da Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos sobre limitação de mandatos na política portuguesa.

Term limits

How many mayors and parish councils were unable to stand again in the 2013 municipal elections? What profile did these mayors have? What impact did the term limits have? And what do mayors think about this? Find the answer to these and other questions in this study by Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.
3 min
Documents
Term limits: the impact on local finances and electoral participation

The entry into force of Law No. 46/2005, of 29 August 2005, marks the introduction of limits on successive renewals of the terms of office of the presidents of local authority executive bodies, who are now subject to the election limit of three consecutive terms. The advantages and disadvantages of imposing limits on the consecutive number of terms in office have been widely discussed, but there is no consensus on whether, in general and in what contexts, these limits are desirable.

This study by Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos analyses the effects of the introduction of limits on the successive renewal of the terms of office of the presidents of local authority executive bodies through Law 46/2005, on the management of municipal finances and on voter turnout in local elections, both at municipal and parish level. More specifically, it addresses the impact of term limits on issues such as:

  • local finances
  • voter turnout
  • the impact that the incentives offered by the possibility of re-election – or otherwise – have on mayors' decisions.


Through this study, FFMS aims to contribute to more informed national debate on the advantages and disadvantages of term limits.

Mayors who are prevented from standing for re-election tend to record lower expenditure and revenue totals per inhabitant than municipalities presided over by re-electable mayors. A more detailed analysis shows that this is mainly due to lower capital expenditure and less revenue from capital transfers not resulting from the State Tax Sharing (PIE). In other words, less revenue from conditional transfers from the state or the European Union. The results also suggest that mayors who are prevented from standing for re-election manage municipal finances in a less electioneering way than re-electable mayors, generating lower increases in expenditure and lower reductions in tax revenue in election years.
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Video presentation of the study
English